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<b>Remarks:</b>  SUBJECT: The Logic of the USIB Committee Structure  This study has been revised in accordance with Mr. Knoche's suggestions.  Mr. Knoche wishes to have 50 or 60 copies of this study, less the covering memo, printed up and circulated as a product of the IC Staff. I will take care of this after you have seen.			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> Acting Chief, CS/IGS			1/14
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Executive Registry

DCI/IC-76-1208/1  
16 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community  
SUBJECT : The Logic of the USIB Committee Structure

1. The attached study, subject as above, responds to three requirements identified by [REDACTED]

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a. The absence of such a study which could have been made available to the Ogilvie Group,

b. The curiosity of Mr. Bush, and

c. The curiosity of your eventual replacement.

2. You are aware that this study may soon be overtaken by reorganizational events. Its potential usefulness should be borne in mind should, for example, the USIB be reconstituted as a National Intelligence Board as suggested by "Option 4 Modified."

3. The study is designed to demonstrate the utility and sense of a structure which might otherwise appear unnecessarily complex and manpower expensive. It has been developed in close coordination with [REDACTED] and is intended partly for their use in upcoming briefings.

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4. In addition to staff coordination, references for this study include:

a. The USIB Committee Survey Task Group Report, August 1973.

b. USIB Executive Secretary Memo, Subject: Survey of USIB Committees, 19 November 1974.

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c. DCI/IC-75-2932, Letter to House Select Committee on Intelligence, 26 August 1975.

d. Studies in Intelligence article, Confessions of a Former USIB Committee Chairman, by David S. Brandwein, undated.

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5. [redacted] departed on leave not expecting this study to be completed prior to his return. The study reflects the guidance which he provided in advance of its preparation. In view of its possible use prior to 19 January, Mr. Knoche advised me to finalize it now and not to wait for [redacted] return on 26 January.

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[redacted]

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Acting Chief  
Coordination Staff, ICS

Attachment:  
as stated

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## THE LOGIC OF THE USIB COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

PURPOSE

Most managers are mindful of the general disadvantages of any committee system, especially the potential for time and effort inefficiencies and the potential for compromise leading to soft judgments and weak recommendations. A cursory look at the 13 USIB Committees and their more than 50 subcommittees might prompt questions regarding their efficiency. This is particularly so in the historical context, given the ad hoc evolution of the committee structure over a period of many years. The purpose of this paper is to show that these considerations to the contrary, the USIB Committee structure today is a logical mechanism which provides effective professional support to the USIB and the DCI over the wide range of specialized intelligence subjects which they must consider.

BACKGROUND

Current Committee Structure: The one informal (SALT Monitoring) and twelve formal USIB Committees are organized by subject matter or function. The memberships are generally composed of trained personnel with experience in the field represented by each committee. Members are drawn from all components of the Community and oversight of the committees is exercised by the D/DCI/IC. The current USIB Committees are:

a. The Committee on Exchanges ensures coordination of Intelligence Community interests in U.S. Government official exchanges and bilateral cooperative agreements, and in commercial visits and other related activities (commercial contacts) with nations designated by Department of State. Its concern is possible loss of U.S. technology resulting from foreign exchanges or agreements.

b. Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) provides staff support to, and acts for, the USIB in development and implementation of national-level guidance for overhead imagery collection and exploitation. This means that COMIREX is the DCI's instrument to develop Community requirements to which national collection systems and NPIC are responsive.

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c. The Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) is a permanent study group responsive to requests submitted to it by the DCI. Its continued existence is currently under review since, for the most part, its functions have been taken over by the National Intelligence Officers and the Intelligence Community Staff. Recent activities include an update of a study on intelligence activities against narcotics and dangerous drugs; and a review of intelligence activities against North Korea.

d. The Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) develops coordinated guidance for the collection of foreign economic intelligence for all relevant users in Washington, D.C.

e. The Human Resources Committee (HRC) advises and assists the DCI in the discharge of his responsibilities for the efficient allocation and effective use of Community resources for the collection of positive foreign intelligence information through human sources. Current emphasis is on increasing the contribution from non-intelligence agencies of the Government.

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g. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) recommends national collection requirements, fosters inter-agency exchanges of information, and contributes to national intelligence. The JAEIC is also responsible for monitoring implementation of the provisions of Safeguard (d) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on behalf of USIB. The ability of foreign countries to protect their nuclear weapons from theft or diversion is receiving current emphasis.

h. Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC) is to provide early warning of foreign S&T advances, whether indigenous or imported, which could affect significantly the national security or political or economic welfare of the U.S. Examples of such technology currently include Soviet high energy laser capabilities and Soviet buried antennas.

i. The Security Committee provides recommendations regarding security policies and procedures for the protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods. Current emphasis is on studies related to compartmentation and computer security questions.

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j. The SIGINT Committee advises and assists in matters involving SIGINT including guidance for the overhead SIGINT programs, policies and procedures for the conduct of SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments, policies and procedures for the protection of SIGINT, and the preparation of SIGINT requirements and priorities.

k. The Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) is responsible for coordinating requirements and Intelligence Community production for foreign weapon and space systems. (Formerly the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, limited to foreign missile and space intelligence.)

l. The Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC) is responsible for facilitating the timely and coordinated handling of intelligence and intelligence information within the Intelligence Community and promoting the continuous improvement, integration and effective use of Community information handling resources.

m. SALT Monitoring Group is not a formal USIB Committee, but was created by USIB and is responsible to the DCI for guidance to and supervision of all intelligence monitoring activities required under the strategic arms limitations agreements with the USSR.

Recent Changes in Committee Structure: The objectives and performance of USIB Committees undergo periodic review as the dynamics of change impact Community requirements. Reflecting this, a substantial number of changes have taken place in the Committee structure in the last two years, as shown below:

a. Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) was established 9 May 1975 following extensive consideration by USIB of two major studies on this subject.

b. Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)--the continued existence of the CCPC is currently under review since, for the most part, its functions have been taken over by the National Intelligence Officers.

c. Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC)--Since it was created in 1974, it has been a catalyst in the current expanded effort throughout much of the Government in the field of economic intelligence.

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d. The Human Resources Committee (HRC) is a relatively new committee which was established on a trial basis in January 1973 and as a permanent committee in June 1974. Its duties and responsibilities have been greatly expanded since that time. It also has assumed the functions of the Inter-agency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC).

e. The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC) is a successor committee to the Scientific Intelligence Committee. It is to concentrate exclusively on S&T intelligence and is no longer involved in weapons' intelligence.

f. Security Committee was given new responsibilities, a much broader charter, and a full-time chairman when a new DCID was approved in 1974. It also absorbed the functions of the old Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee.

g. The SIGINT Committee--following a major review of the SIGINT Committee by a Special Ad Hoc Group the committee was provided with a new DCID, broader responsibilities and additional staff support.

h. Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC)--is a new committee established in January 1976. It has absorbed the weapons' intelligence responsibilities of the old Scientific Intelligence Committee and is now responsible for coordinating all requirements and intelligence community production for foreign weapons and space systems.

i. Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) was subsumed within the Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) structure.

j. Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) was taken over by the Human Resources Committee.

k. National Intelligence Survey Committee was disbanded 30 June 1974.

l. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee has become a subcommittee of the Security Committee.

m. Scientific Intelligence Committee responsibilities were changed and evolved into the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee as of January 1976.

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n. Watch Committee was disestablished 3 March 1975 and new and broader responsibilities in strategic warning were assumed by the Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning and his staff located in the Pentagon.

# COMMENTS ON COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

## PROS

It is obvious that the current USIB Committee structure is the product of an evolutionary process and that the structure itself has become institutionalized. This is not to say, however, that the structure is archaic, outmoded, inefficient or in any other way undesirable. The following comments demonstrate the strengths of the structure:

a. The USIB Committee structure responds to the stated needs of the USIB. The individual committees deal with problems which are of continuing concern to the USIB. Standing committees and a substructure of subcommittees are more effective than ad hoc task group handling of problems which are continuing in nature.

b. The committee structure is dynamic. Committees are established, disbanded, or have their charters amended as the situation and the USIB needs warrant.

c. The Committee structure is relatively objective in that it provides a forum for representation of all elements of the Intelligence Community, with no one organization in a position to dominate. Principal membership of each committee is derived from all member agencies represented at the USIB but, unlike the USIB, the services have full membership rather than observer status.

d. The Committee structure is not overly costly in manpower. Very few personnel are involved full-time with committee work,\* and in those few cases the committee is handling ongoing day-to-day problems which require constant attention. Most committee chairmen and participants are line officers with duty and experience relating directly to the committee subject matter. The line organizations are available as a source of part-time support to committee activities.

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e. The USIB Committee structure makes a constructive contribution to the entire Community in addition to its support of the USIB and the DCI, as follows:

(1) The structure provides forums at which the various elements of the Community can present their views in the development of Community positions.

(2) The committees and their working groups become educational focal points for face-to-face exchange of Community views and information. They provide a unique outlet for discussion of parochial ideas or observations.

(3) The structure provides an alternate method of surfacing substantive ideas which merit DCI attention and which otherwise are subject to bureaucratic barriers.

(4) The structure provides for visibility of major issues through the USIB which can alert the DCI in advance of such issues surfacing at the policy levels of other agencies or departments.

f. The IC Staff exists to support the DCI in his Community leadership role. The IC Staff role vis-a-vis the USIB Committee structure assists management by:

(1) Preparing and/or coordinating annual Letters of Instruction from the DCI to committee chairmen. The IC Staff not only sets tasks for committees, but receives annual reports from each committee which are evaluative in nature and which form the basis for new Letters of Instruction.

(2) Periodic meetings of all committee chairmen with the DCI and the D/DCI/IC.

(3) Receiving monthly activity reports from each committee to the D/DCI/IC.

(4) Preparing and initially coordinating pertinent Director of Central Intelligence Directives before submission to the DCI and the USIB.

(5) Including key committee chairmen at daily IC Staff meetings (COMIREX, SIGINT, Human Resources, Security, and Intelligence Information Handling).

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g. The USIB Committee structure provides:

(1) A flexible system for professional support to the DCI. In addition to the wide range of specialized subjects which committees can cover for the USIB, the committees can be tasked to support the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee as appropriate. Each committee chairman is available to the DCI to perform staff studies or other assignments which require a coordinated Community approach.

(2) A unique coordinating mechanism. Given the present structure of the Community, composed as it is of a group of autonomous agencies, there is no other Community-wide system for interagency coordination and information exchange.

(3) Functional continuity. Because such standing committees provide a more effective means of handling a wide variety of problems than would a series of ad hoc committees convened to deal with each new problem, substance continuity is built into the structure.

(4) A useful institutional history. As such, a backdrop exists against which new action items can be viewed from a perspective of precedent and for efficacy of previous treatment.

(5) An effective safeguard system for the DCI. The topical/functional structure complements the NIO structure to the extent that there is less likelihood that any substantive issue will escape the deserved attention of the DCI.

#### CONS

No organizational structure is perfect and, indeed, the USIB Committee structure has had a number of charges leveled against its effectiveness. The following comments underscore the potential weaknesses of the system:

a. The USIB Committee structure includes inadequate safeguards against assignment of incompetent or unqualified representatives to the various committees. Ad hoc committees, for example, might enjoy the advantage of recruiting members based on known expertise.

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b. The USIB Committee structure may not be truly representative of individual USIB agencies' interests since the preponderance of chairmen are drawn from CIA.

c. Since committee matters are generally a part-time function for those involved, the system may fail to give maximum support to the DCI and the USIB.

d. Committee chairmen have no line authority over committee members, thus lacking the leverage of command necessary to ensure proper effort and high quality results.

e. In the absence of a continuing review of the USIB Committee structure, substantive issues can arise which are not within the charter of any existing committee and which can therefore elude proper handling through simple omission.

f. The USIB Committee structure provides for no formal systematic interaction among committees which can result in compartmented judgments and duplication of effort.

#### DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES

a. It has happened that unqualified people have been assigned to USIB committees from time to time. The major safeguard against this happening reposes in the USIB principals themselves and the degree of importance each one attaches to committee assignments. Offsetting this potential weakness is the careful selection of individual chairmen who, through their own qualifications, can ensure effective committee output. Since most committee chairmen perform part-time in their respective roles, a further safeguard exists in assigning a top caliber secretariat to each committee who can spend the needed time to do all the staff work connected with committee affairs.

b. Four committee chairmen are non-CIA, while the remainder are from CIA. Does this disproportionate number of CIA chairmen in any way compromise objectivity? Does any chairman exercise undue influence over his committee regardless of the agency which he represents? Committee chairmen generally are selected for the expertise which they bring to bear on committee subject matters and function primarily in line jobs related to committee affairs. By the nature of their work they have available to them an appreciation of all-source contributions germane to their respective committees. In some cases it is difficult to separate a chairman's committee work from his regular

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line duties. More often than not this serves the committee's advantage since the chairman is not totally dependent upon other committee members for information on the subject at hand. Additionally, the very nature of the CIA is such that its members are less likely to be influenced in areas such as weapons development by parochial interests. The structure provides for all USIB member agencies to be represented equally on all formal USIB committees and, in some cases, to have associate members or observers from non-USIB agencies. Although there have been exceptions, military personnel are not often named as committee chairmen because frequency of reassignment would tend to disrupt continuity of committee leadership.

c. Most committee matters are a part-time function for most committee members. It might be argued, therefore, that the system cannot provide maximum support to the USIB. The structure does, however, provide for optimum support to the USIB as subject matter might demand. Each committee secretariat supplies needed continuity of operations and staff coordination. Each chairman supplies professional knowledge and staff support when needed. Full-time committee membership with full-time supporting staffs would create diseconomies of function and manpower.

d. The fact that committee chairmen have no command leverage over other committee members reflects the autonomy of the agencies which comprise the Community. It is a fact which cannot be dealt with from a structural point of view short of abandoning the Community concept. Any system which might replace the USIB Committee structure would encounter the identical problem, given the current Community organization.

e. It is possible for substantive issues to be ignored because they fail to fit the charter of any existing USIB committee. It is less likely today that this might occur than once was true because, as alluded to earlier, the NIO structure effectively complements the USIB committees. The geographic orientation of the former and the topical/functional orientation of the latter combine to form a net in which to catch issues of omission. This tends to force DCI and USIB attention to such matters, enabling them to be treated on an ad hoc basis.

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f. It may be true that the USIB Committee structure provides for no formal systematic interaction among committees to the degree that lateral coordination exists in a traditional line-staff organization. This potential gap is filled, however, by DCID 1/3 which directs committee coordination in matters of overlapping concern, and by the separate committee DCID's which iterate that direction. Additionally, the annual Letters of Instruction to each committee may direct coordination with other specifically named committees. Beyond these measures, considerable informal coordination takes place among committees and the IC Staff monitors coordination by acting as focal point for preparation of LOI's and, indeed, by tasking the USIB Committees to perform studies and meet other requirements.

#### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This paper is not intended to measure the relative value of each USIB Committee, but to present the entire committee mechanism in a positive light, to show that there is logic to this supporting system. Many commonly desirable organizational characteristics are incorporated in the USIB Committee structure and several which are uniquely desirable. No serious weaknesses exist which defy explanation. It is likely that no other organizational system could replace the committee structure without objectionable trade-offs in manpower, objectivity, and effectiveness. The structure supports the DCI and the USIB as it is supposed to do while providing a mechanism through which issues can surface from below. The system works.

The weight of logic indicates that the USIB Committee structure should be retained so long as the USIB exists in its present form. The process of change is apparently an inherent part of the committee structure. It is important, therefore, that management of the USIB system include provisions for continuing review of the several committees and that such review enjoy a high management priority.



Coordination Staff, ICS

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# THE LOGIC OF THE USIB COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

PREPARED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

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DCI/IC 76-4108

16 January 1976

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# THE LOGIC OF THE USIB COMMITTEE STRUCTURE



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## THE LOGIC OF THE USIB COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

### PURPOSE

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## DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES

a. It has happened that unqualified people have been assigned to USIB committees from time to time. The major safeguard against this happening reposes in the USIB principals themselves and the degree of importance each one attaches to committee assignments. Offsetting this potential weakness is the careful selection of individual chairmen who, through their own qualifications, can ensure effective committee output. Since most committee chairmen perform part-time in their respective roles, a further safeguard exists in assigning a top caliber secretariat to each committee who can spend the needed time to do all the staff work connected with committee affairs.

b. Four committee chairmen are non-CIA, while the remainder are from CIA. Does this disproportionate number of CIA chairmen in any way compromise objectivity? Does *any* chairman exercise undue influence over his committee regardless of the agency which he represents? Committee chairmen generally are selected for the expertise which they bring to bear on committee subject matters and function primarily in line jobs related to committee affairs. By the nature of their work they have available to them an appreciation of all-source contributions germane to their respective committees. In some cases it is difficult to separate a chairman's committee work from his regular line duties. More often than not this serves the committee's advantage since the chairman is not totally dependent upon other committee members for information on the subject at hand. Additionally, the very nature of the CIA is such that its members are less likely to be influenced in areas such as weapons development by parochial interests. The structure provides for all USIB member agencies to be represented equally on all formal USIB committees and, in some cases, to have associate members or observers from non-USIB agencies. Although there have been exceptions, military personnel are not often named as committee chairmen because frequency of reassignment would tend to disrupt continuity of committee leadership.

c. Most committee matters are a part-time function for most committee members. It might be argued, therefore, that the system cannot provide maximum support to the USIB. The structure does, however, provide for *optimum* support to the USIB as subject matter might demand. Each com-



mittee secretariat supplies needed continuity of operations and staff coordination. Each chairman supplies professional knowledge and staff support when needed. Full-time committee membership with full-time supporting staffs would create diseconomies of function and manpower.

d. The fact that committee chairmen have no command leverage over other committee members reflects the autonomy of the agencies which comprise the Community. It is a fact which cannot be dealt with from a structural point of view short of abandoning the Community concept. Any system which might replace the USIB Committee structure would encounter the identical problem, given the current Community organization.

e. It is possible for substantive issues to be ignored because they fail to fit the charter of any existing USIB committee. It is less likely today that this might occur than once was true because, as alluded to earlier, the NIO structure effectively complements the USIB committees. The geographic orientation of the former and the topical/functional orientation of the latter combine to form a net in which to catch issues of omission. This tends to force DCI and USIB attention to such matters, enabling them to be treated on an ad hoc basis.

f. It may be true that the USIB Committee structure provides for no formal systematic interaction among committees to the degree that lateral coordination exists in a traditional line-staff organization. This potential gap is filled, however, by DCID 1/.3 which directs committee coordination in matters of overlapping concern, and by the separate committee DCID's which iterate that direction. Additionally, the annual Letters of Instruction to each committee may direct coordination with other specifically named committees. Beyond these measures, considerable informal coordination takes place among committees and the IC Staff monitors coordination by acting as focal point for preparation of LOI's and, indeed, by tasking the USIB Committees to perform studies and meet other requirements.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This paper is not intended to measure the relative value of each USIB committee, but to present the entire committee mechanism in a positive light, to show that there is logic to this supporting system. Many commonly desirable organizational characteristics are incorporated in the USIB Committee structure and several which are uniquely desirable. No serious weaknesses exist which defy explanation. It is likely that no other organizational system could replace the committee structure without objectionable trade-offs in manpower, objectivity, and effectiveness. The structure supports the DCI and the USIB as it is supposed to do while providing a mechanism through which issues can surface from below. The system works.

The weight of logic indicates that the USIB Committee structure should be retained so long as the USIB exists in its present form. The process of change is apparently an inherent part of the committee structure. It is important, therefore, that management of the USIB system include provisions for continuing review of the several committees and that such review enjoy a high management priority.

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